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I. INTRODUCTION

In November 2007, Small Island Developing States, meeting in the
Maldives, adopted the Male' Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global
Climate Change.' The declaration laid down a roadmap for actions within the
UN system designed to explore and draw attention to the relationship between
global warming and the full enjoyment of human rights. In June 2009 the
various steps foreseen in the Male' Declaration reached their conclusion when
the United Nations Human Rights Council (the Council or the Human Rights
Council) held a dedicated interactive panel debate on the relationship between
human rights and climate change during its Eleventh Session in June 2009.
The present time, therefore, offers an important opportunity to take stock
of progress achieved since the Male' Declaration was adopted, to assess the
current situation, and to consider possible next steps. This Article will offer
an assessment of what has been achieved by the rapidly evolving international
agenda on human rights and climate change. It will do so by looking at how
the international understanding of the complex and multifaceted relationship
between climate change and human rights has evolved over the past one and
a half years. This will entail an analysis of the degree to which the
international community, through the process launched by the Male'
Declaration, has answered three crucial questions pertaining to the human
rights climate change interface:
1. Is there a relationship between climate change and human
rights, and if so, what is the nature of that relationship?
2. Does climate change constitute a violation of human rights,
especially the rights of vulnerable people?
3. Irrespective of whether climate change represents a human
rights violation, what are states' national-level and
international-level human rights obligations pertaining to
climate change?
After assessing progress in addressing these three central questions, the
Article will then move to propose possible next steps, on behalf of the
international community, to further clarify the issues at hand and to transpose

Male' Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, Nov. 14, 2007,
availableat http://www.ciel.org/Publications/MaleDeclarationNovO7.pdf [hereinafter Male'
Declaration].
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that understanding into actual mechanisms to better promote and protect
human rights in the face of climate change.
This Article will focus solely on actions undertaken within the context of
the United Nations Human Rights Council2 and related international human
rights mechanisms.3 Although academia and non-governmental bodies have
played a crucial role in the evolution of the human rights, climate change
agenda,4 their contribution will not be covered here. Moreover, in analyzing
progress, the Article will focus on the evolution of hard and soft law in the
area, and not on the broader perceptional achievements of the human rights and
climate change agenda. Notwithstanding this necessary (for reasons of space)
omission, it is clear that such perceptional achievements (i.e., how seeing
climate change through a human rights lens has changed the nature of the
international conversation on the subject) have been extremely significant (and
probably more so than legal achievements).

Hl.

THE MALE' DECLARATION

On November 13-14, 2007, a group of the world's most vulnerable Small
Island Developing States convened in the Maldives to discuss the possible
human rights implications of climate change.' The impetus for the meeting,
which would be the first time that any group of states had made a concerted
attempt to draw linkages between hitherto separate bodies of law, was threefold.6 First, there was a general frustration on the part of vulnerable
communities at the slow pace of progress in tackling climate change using the
traditional politico-scientific approach. This in turn suggested that a new
supplementary framework was needed. Second, there was a growing sense on
the part of these groups that, with a scientific consensus on climate change
largely in place, it was time to shift the debate onto the victims of the
2 The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the UN system made up

of forty-seven states responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights
around the globe. UN Human Rights Council, Membership of the Human Rights Council,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/membership.htm (last visited July 13, 2010).
The Council was created by the UN General Assembly on March 15,2006 with the main purpose
of addressing situations ofhuman rights violations and to make recommendations on them. G.A.
Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).
Especially human rights Treaty Bodies and human rights Special Procedures.
4 See Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructinga Casefor Political
Action, 33 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 439 (2009).
Male' Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl.
6 See Limon, supra note 4, at 440-41.
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problem-namely individual people and communities around the world.
Third, and linked to the previous point, those communities most at risk from
climate change became increasingly frustrated at the lack of any kind of
accountability framework to deal with a phenomenon caused by man and with
devastating human consequences.
The outcome of the meeting-the Male' Declaration on the Human
Dimension of Climate Change-stated explicitly, and for the first time in an
international agreement, that "climate change has clear and immediate
implications for the full enjoyment of human rights"7 and called on the United
Nations human rights system to address the issue as a matter of urgency.8 The
declaration lays down three key steps that it wishes the human rights system
to take. First, it calls for the Human Rights Council to actively consider the
human rights implications of global warming by holding a dedicated debate on
the matter.9 Second, it requests "[t]he Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] to conduct a detailed study into
the effects of climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights" in order
to inform the Council's considerations." ° Finally, it recommends that the
Council process feed into and complement the ongoing United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) climate change
negotiation process."1
Beyond defining this roadmap for taking forward the issue of climate
change and human rights, the Male' Declaration did not offer any substantive
guidance on how the Small Island Developing States themselves viewed the
interface between the two. This was because the vague frustration felt by
Small Island Developing States at the inadequacies of the current UNFCCC
process, and the parallel sense that, in order to confront those inadequacies,
vulnerable states must move human beings and their fundamental rights to the
center ground of the debate, delegates were not yet sure how to leverage
human rights law to achieve their ends.
The Small Island Developing States thus opted for a largely procedural
declaration that would, through the OHCHR's report and the subsequent

' Male' Declaration, supra note 1, at pmbl. para. 12.
8 Id 11.
9 Id. 5.
1oId. 4.
" See id. 3 (requesting "[t]he Conference of the Parties of the [UNFCCC] ...to seek the
cooperation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the
United Nations Human Rights Council in assessing the human rights implications of climate
change").
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Council debate, provide greater clarity on the precise nature of the interface
between climate change and human rights, and suggest ways in which that
interface might be mobilized to energize and improve international climate
change policy and to better protect the rights of vulnerable individuals.

III. OHCHR REPORT
The Male' Declaration had an immediate impact both within the UNFCCC
process and within the international human rights community.
Regarding the former, the Thirteenth Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC
(COP-13) in Bali featured keynote speeches by both then President of the
Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, and the UN Deputy High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, which both made clear reference to the
human rights implications of climate change. In his address, during which he
presented the Male' Declaration to assembled delegates, President Gayoom
stated:
[Small Island Developing States] believe that climate change
must be viewed not only as a danger to natural systems, but also
as a direct threat to human survival and well-being. We are
convinced that this negotiation process must not be viewed as a
traditional series of governmental trade-offs, but as an urgent
international effort to safeguard human lives, homes, rights and
livelihoods.'2
Echoing these sentiments, Deputy High Commissioner Kang said: "[A]ny
strategy to deal with climate change, whether in terms of adaptation or
mitigation, must incorporate the consequences for humans, as individuals and
communities, and the human rights framework is the most effective way to do

so ."

2

Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Maldives, Address at the Thirteenth Session

of the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC and the Third Session of the Meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.maldivesmission.ch/fileadmin/Pdf/
Environment/President atBaliConference_2012122007_final_.pdf.
" Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Comm'r for Human Rights, Address at the Thirteenth
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC and the Third Session of the Meeting of the Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 14,2007), http://www.maldivesmission.ch/fileadmin/Pdf/Environnm
ent/DHCStatementBaliFinal.pdf.
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The theme of human rights and climate change was also widely discussed
during the Human Rights Council session held immediately after the adoption
of the Male' Declaration-the Seventh Substantive Session in March 2008.
During the session's ministerial and general segments, 14 Bolivia, Bhutan,
Greece, the Maldives, Nigeria, Indonesia, and the Philippines all noted the
serious consequences of climate change for the full enjoyment of human rights
and called on the Council to address the human rights dimension. 5 Then, on
March 28, 2008, the Maldives together with seventy-eight co-sponsors from
all regional groups, secured the adoption, by consensus, of United Nations
Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 on "Human rights and climate
change"' 6 which, for the first time in an official UN resolution, stated
explicitly (in preambular paragraph 1) that climate change "poses an

'4 General segments feature keynote statements on human rights (ambassador-level) by states
that were not able to be represented at the ministerial-level, or senior government-level. See
Office of the High Comm'r of Human Rights, Modalities for a High-Level Segment of the
Human Rights Council at its Seventh Session in March 2008, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bod
iesihrcouncil/docs/7session/ModalitiesHLS.pdf(discussing the purpose ofthe general segment).
5 OJOMADUEKWE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFNIG., STATEMENT AT THE HIGH-LEVEL
SEGMENT OF THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (Mar. 4,2008), available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/7session/hls/Nigeria-E.pdf;
SONAM T.

RABGYE, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BHUTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS, STATEMENT AT
THE HIGH-LEVEL SEGMENT OF THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (Mar. 5,

2008) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalofInternationaland ComparativeLaw); ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, SEC'Y OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PHIL., STATEMENT AT THE HIGH-LEVEL SEGMENT
OF THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, BEHIND A COMMON CAUSE:

ADVANCING WITH RESOLVE, FINDING STRENGTH IN SYNERGY (Mar. 3, 2008), available at

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/7session/hls/Philippines-E.pdf;

ABDULLA

SHAHID, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE MALDIVES, STATEMENT AT THE HIGH-LEVEL
SEGMENT OF THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (Mar. 4, 2008), available

at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/7session/hls/Maldives-E.pdf;

N. HASSAN

WIRAJUDA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF INDON., STATEMENT AT THE HIGH-LEVEL
SEGMENT OF THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (Mar. 4, 2008), available

at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/7session/hls/Indonesia-E.pdf;
Webcast:
Sacha Sergio Llorenti Soliz, Vice Minister of Coordination with Soc. Movements & Civil Soc'y
ofBol., Statement at High-Level Segment of the Seventh Session of the Human Rights Council
(United Nations Human Rights Council, Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/arc
hive.asp?go=080303; Webcast: Franciscos Verros, Permanent Representative of Greece to the
United Nations at Geneva, Statement at High-Level Segment of the Seventh Session of the
Human Rights Council (United Nations Human Rights Council, Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.un.
org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080305.
6 Human Rights and Climate Change, H.R.C. Res. 7/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/78 (July 14,
2008) [hereinafter UNHRC 7/23].
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immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world
and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights."' 7
Yet, that single sentence aside, Resolution 7/23, like the Male' Declaration,
was silent on the substantive nature of the "implications" of climate change for
the enjoyment of human rights and what those implications should mean in
practice. This reticence, which even included a refusal on the part of some
states (especially certain industrialized states) to countenance the inclusion of
a list of those rights most affected by climate change (as had been included in
preambular paragraph 12 of the Male' Declaration), demonstrated that it was
notjust Small Island Developing States that were unsure as to the exact nature
of the relationship between climate change and human rights and, more
importantly, as to the legal implications of that relationship for both climate
change policy and human rights policy.
As with the Small Island Developing State representatives in Male', the
members of the Human Rights Council responded to these doubts by agreeing
to give further consideration to the issue, and for that consideration to be
informed by an expert analysis by the OHCHR. Through Resolution 7/23,
states, therefore, asked the OHCHR to prepare "a detailed analytical study on
the relationship between climate change and human rights, to be submitted to
the Council prior to its tenth session."18
The OHCHR published its report on climate change and human rights in
January 2009.'9 The report was based on written and oral submissions by over
thirty states, and thirty-five international agencies, national human rights
institutions, NGOs, and academic bodies.2" Although many of those
submissions were largely descriptive in nature-for example explaining what
steps individual states were taking to adapt to climate change-others
(especially the national submissions of Canada, Mali, the Maldives, the
Marshall Islands, the United States, and the United Kingdom) began the
process of identifying and considering key issues and questions pertaining to

1"Id.at pmbl. para. 1.
IS Id.

1.

U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Report of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissionerfor Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate Change
and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/l0/61 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter OHCHR Report].
20 See OHCHR, Study on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights:
Submissions and Reference Documents Received, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climate
change/submissions.htm (last visited July 13, 2010) (providing list with links to all documents
received by OHCHR).
19
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the intersection of human rights and climate change.2' These individual
analyses were distilled and built-upon by OHCHR and, in its published report,
it identified three key legal questions:
1. Is there a relationship between climate change and human
rights, and if so, what is the nature of that relationship?
2. Does climate change constitute a violation of human rights,
especially the rights of vulnerable people?
3. Irrespective of whether climate change represents a human
rights violation, what are states' national-level and
international-level
human rights obligations pertaining to
22
climate change?
Each of these questions will be explored in the sections that follow.
A. Is There a RelationshipBetween Climate Change and Human Rights, and
If so, What Is the Nature of That Relationship?
It may appear surprising that the OHCHR needed to answer the question of
whether there is any kind of relationship between climate change and the full
enjoyment of human rights. That linkages exist would seem self-evident.
However, during negotiations on Resolution 7/23, a number of states argued
strongly against the assertion in preambular paragraph one, that climate change
"has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights. 23 The basis of this
opposition becomes clear by referring to the national submissions to the
OHCHR report of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Canada, for example, only "acknowledges that there can be an impact on the
effective enjoyment of human rights as a result of situations arisingfrom
environmental degradation amplifled by climate change., 24 Similarly, the

21Id.
22See OHCHR Report, supra note 19,

92-99 (outlining the conclusions made by the

OHCHR).
23 UNIIRC 7/23, supra note 16, at pmbl. para. 1.
24 Submission of Canada to OHCHR Report, Government of Canada Response to Request
for Information by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Concerning a

Request in Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 for a Detailed Analytical Study of the
Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, at I (Nov. 2008), http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/issues/climatechange/docs/canada.pdf [hereinafter Canada OHCHR Report
Submission] (emphasis added).
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United Kingdom "recognises that climate change may impact on the full
enjoyment of human rights at the nationallevel.... . 2s The United States
meanwhile took a different approach-agreeing with the language in
Resolution 7/23, that "climate change . . . has implications for the full
enjoyment of human rights," but noting "of course, that [such] statements are
factual observations rather than statements of international law., 26 The U.S.
submission also points out that the effects of climate change on the enjoyment
of human rights can be positive as well as negative.2 7
In its report, the OHCHR responded decisively to these obfuscations by
clearly concluding that:
Climate change-related impacts.., have a range of implications
for the effective enjoyment of human rights. The effects on
human rights can be of a direct nature, such as the threat extreme
weather events may pose to the right to life, but will often have
an indirect and gradual effect on human rights, such as increasing
stress on health systems and vulnerabilities related to climate
change-induced migration.2 8
After clearly stating that there is an important connection between climate
change and the enjoyment of human rights, OHCHR then provides its views
on the exact nature of the relationship. It draws four broad conclusions.
First, although "global warming will potentially have implications for the
full range of human rights,"29 certain specific rights are most directly affected.
OHCHR lists these as: the right to life; the right to adequate food; the right to
water; the right to health; the right to adequate housing; and the right to selfdetermination.3"

25 Submission of U.K. to OHCHR Report, Assessment at National Level of the Impact of

Climate Change (Experienced or Anticipated) on Human Lives and on Population Most Affected
and Vulnerable (2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/English/issues/climatechange/docs/submissions/
uk.pdf [hereinafter U.K. OHCHR Report Submission] (emphasis added).
26 Submission of U.S. to OHCHR Report, Observations by the United States of America on
the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights $ 14 (2008), http://www2.ohchr.
org/English/issues/climatechange/docs/submissions/USA.pdf [hereinafter U.S. OHCHR Report
Submission].
27 Id.
15.
28 OHCHR Report, supra note 19, $ 92.
29 Id. 9 20.
'0 Id. 99 21-41.
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Second, the report notes that the human rights impacts of climate change
will be felt unevenly both between and within nations. Regarding the former,
the report highlights the particular geographic vulnerability of those living "on
the 'front line' of climate change," where global warming can have often
"catastrophic consequences" for human rights.3 Moreover, climate change
"disproportionally affect[s] poorer regions and countries"32 which also suffer
from a "low capacity to adapt."33 Unfortunately the OHCHR fails to place
these observations within the context of "climate justice ' 34 or "climate
injustice" 3 5-the recognition that those states that are the most vulnerable to
climate change and have the lowest adaptive capacity, are also the same
countries that have contributed least (through green house gas emissions) to
the problem. Regarding the latter, the OHCHR argues that climate change
impacts will be felt most acutely "by those segments of the population who are
already in vulnerable situations owing to such factors as geography, poverty,
gender, age, indigenous or minority status and disability."36 OHCHR notes
that "[u]nder international human rights law, States are legally bound to
address such vulnerabilities in accordance with the principle of equality and
non-discrimination."

37

Third, the report notes that climate change is very likely to lead to largescale human rights crises with horizontal impacts across the aforementioned
specific rights and across the aforementioned vulnerable population groups.
In particular, the report draws attention to the human rights implications of
mass displacement caused by climate change-recalling the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) prediction that 150 million people might be
displaced by 2050.38
Finally, the OHCHR makes the often overlooked point that as well as the
direct and indirect impacts of climate change itself, measures taken to mitigate
and adapt to global warming can also have adverse secondary effects on human

31Id. 93.
32 Id.

10.

33 Id. 93.
3' Term coined by Kofi Annan's Global Humanitarian Forum.
3 Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Comm'r for Human Rights, Opening Remarks at Human

Rights Council Panel Discussion on the Relationship Between Human Rights and Climate
Change, Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council, at 2 (June 15, 2009), http://www2.
ohchr.org/englishlissues/climatechange/docs/openingHRCPanelHRl 5June2009.pdf.
36 Id. at 3.

37 OHCHR Report, supra note 19,
31 Id. IM55-60.

42.
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rights. For example, agro-fuel production can negatively affect the right to
food.

39

B. Does Climate Change Constitutea Violation ofHuman Rights, Especially
the Rights of Vulnerable People?
The second key question identified and answered by the OHCHR is
whether climate change can be called a violation of human rights.4" After
reading its assessment of the many ways in which climate change undermines
human rights, one might expect the OHCHR to respond to this question in the
affirmative. Instead, it states: "While climate change has obvious implications
for the enjoyment of human rights, it is less obvious whether, and to what
extent, such effects can be qualified as human rights violations in a strict legal
sense."' It described three obstacles to treating the effects of climate change
as human rights violations: (1) "it is virtually impossible to disentangle the
complex causal relationships" linking the emissions of a particular country to
a specific effect;4" (2) "global warming is often one of several contributing
factors to climate change-related effects, such as hurricanes [or] environmental
degradation" which makes it "often impossible" to establish how such an event
is attributable to global warming;43 and (3) the "adverse effects of global
warming are often projections about future impacts, whereas human rights
violations are normally established after the harm has occurred."'
John Knox has argued that although not trivial, these problems are not
insurmountable. Regarding the first obstacle, Knox argues that "[i]t is not
necessary to link the emissions of a particular state to a particular harm in
order to assign responsibility for the harm" and that it is possible to assign
responsibility for a climate change-induced harm based on relative emissions
levels (although historical emissions are problematic).45 For example, he notes
that just seven states are responsible for more than two-thirds of global
emissions. "On this basis, it would be possible, at least in principle, to

9 Id. 65.
4 For an excellent critique of the OHCHR's analysis of this question, see John H. Knox,
Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33 HARV. ENvTL. L.
REv. 477, 493-96 (2009).
41 OHCHR Report, supra note 19,
70.
Id.
43Id.
4 Id.

42

"' Knox, supra note 40, at 489.
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conclude that even if all states contribute to climate change and are therefore
joint violators of the human rights affected by it, some states are far more
culpable than others, and to allocate responsibility [for the violation]
accordingly."4' 6 Another solution was suggested by the well-known Inuit
Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights47 which "sought
to hold one state responsible for activities undertaken in several different
states-applying both criminal law principles of joint liability and, more
innovatively, the UNFCCC's own principle of 'common but differentiated
responsibilities.' ,,48
During a public hearing on the case, Martin Wagner (of
Earthjustice), counselor for the petitioners, contended that each state is
responsible separately as well as jointly.49 In its national submission to the
OHCHR study, the U.S. obliquely recognises that "novel theories of
responsibility" such as these might be devised.5" On the second obstacle, Knox
argues that while some climate change-related effects such as hurricanes may
well have diffuse contributing factors, others effects such as sea-level rise,
receding glaciers, and the thawing of permafrost manifestly are caused by
climate change. 1 Finally, regarding the applicability of human rights law to
future projections, the OHCHR itself acknowledges that an effect on a human

"Id. This argument is supported by the International Council for Human Rights Policy
(ICHRP) which has argued that "specific actors are responsible for climate change - namely,
those who overuse carbon fuels, albeit in highly varying degrees ....The question is whether
this group can be broken into definite and identifiable parties to whom responsibility can be
attributed in a specific and discrete manner." INT'L COUNcIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POL'Y,
CLMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A ROUGH GuIDE 65 (2008) [hereinafter CUMATE
CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS].

"7Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States
(Dec. 7,2005) [hereinafter Inuit Petition], availableathttp://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/up
loads/icc-files/finalpetitionicc.pdf.
48 CLIMvATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 46, at 42.
49 Id. & n. 102. ICHRP has noted that:
[Ilt is common in environmental litigation, where there are numerous
polluters, for a court to shift the burden of proof and hold the defendant liable
unless he or she can mitigate responsibility by proving the proportional
liability of other wrongdoers. Under theories of joint and several liability,
each wrongdoer is held responsible for the entire harm in some circumstances.
Such doctrines serve to deter pollution by all and ensure greater likelihood of
redress for victims.
Id. at 43.
50 U.S. OHCHR Report Submission, supra note 26,
26.
5'Knox, supra note 40, at 488-89.
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right does not have to have occurred in order to indicate a violation; the effect
may be "imminent.""
C. Irrespective of Whether Climate Change Represents a Human Rights
Violation, What Are States' National-level and International-levelHuman
Rights ObligationsPertainingto Climate Change?
After stating that "[t]he physical impacts of global warming cannot easily
be classified as human rights violations" the OHCHR report continues "[y]et,
addressing that harm remains a critical human rights concern and obligation
under international law."53 In Section III of the report, the OHCHR clarifies
that such obligations exist at both the national-level and the internationallevel.54
The OHCHR identifies three distinct layers of national human rights
obligations applicable to climate change. Firstly, "irrespective of the
additional strain climate change-related events may place on available
resources, States remain under an obligation to ensure the widest possible
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights under any given
circumstances." 5 5 Second, the full enjoyment of procedural rights including
access to information, participation in decision-making, and access to
administrative and judicial remedies, especially on the part of vulnerable
groups, are of critical importance to the success of national efforts to address
climate change.56 Third, human rights standards and principles, such as
equality, non-discrimination, and universal access to at least basic levels of
economic, social, and cultural rights must be applied to climate change policymaking in order to promote "policy coherence and sustainable outcomes"57 and
to ensure that policy solutions are directed towards those parts of the
population that are most in need-including marginalized and vulnerable
members of society.5"
While the second and third layers, which essentially suggest that wellgoverned societies are more adaptable and climate-resilient than less
progressive ones, are clearly important and relevant points, the first layer of
2 OHCHR Report, supranote 19,
53 Id. 96.
54 Id. 69-91.

" Id 177.
78-79.
56 Id
57 Id.
80-83.
5 Id.

70 n.104.
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human rights obligations identified by OHCHR-which posits that irrespective
of the additional burden placed on states by climate change such states still
retain the same level of legal obligation to fulfill the human rights of their
citizens-seems perverse from the viewpoint of small vulnerable states like the
Maldives, Bhutan, or Tuvalu. Those states are, in effect, being asked to
shoulder additional strain because of a downward drag on the enjoyment of
economic, social, and cultural rights caused by the irresponsible environmental
actions of countries beyond their borders and far beyond their effective
control. Taken to the extreme, it suggests that even if industrialized nations
defy their legal obligations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, causing
Small Island Developing States to become slowly uninhabitable, those small
states nevertheless retain exactly the same level of legal obligation to fulfill the
rights of their people to, for example, adequate housing and food.
However, importantly, the OHCHR balances its judgement on the absolute
and inalienable nature of national-level obligations with an equally forceful
conclusion on the existence of parallel, mutually-inclusive obligations held at
the international-level.5 9 In a summary of a number of different General
Comments by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
OHCHR in its report proposes four distinct types of international or
extraterritorial human rights obligations. The OHCHR argues that states have
a legal obligation to:
1. Refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights
in other countries[;]
2. Take measures to prevent third parties (e.g., private
companies) over which they hold influence from interfering
with the enjoyment of human rights in other countries[;]
3. Take steps through international assistance and cooperation,
depending on the availability of resources, to facilitate
fulfillment of human rights in other countries... [;] and
4. Ensure that human rights are given due attention in
international agreements and that such agreements do not
adversely impact upon human rights.6"
In its conclusions, OHCHR builds on this analysis and states that:
"International human rights law complements the United Nations Framework

59Id. 84-88.

6Id. 86.
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Convention on Climate Change by underlining that international cooperation
is not only expedient but also a human rights obligation and that its central
objective is the realization of human rights."'"
This is without question the most progressive and important contribution
of the OHCHR to both the evolution of human rights law (as it pertains to
international cooperation) and, potentially, to the evolution of climate change
policy.
In short, it suggests that all states that are party to the ICESCR
have a legal obligation through international cooperation (i.e., the
UNFCCC process) to reduce emissions to levels consistent with
the full enjoyment of human rights (i.e., safe levels) in all other
countries (especially vulnerable countries), to fund adaptation
measures in vulnerable countries (depending on the availability
of resources), and to ensure that the international climate change
agreement due to be penned at COP 15 in Copenhagen is
consistent with those human rights obligations and, at the very
least, does not adversely impact human rights.62
Thus, on the issue of human rights obligations as they pertain to climate
change, the OHCHR clearly concludes that important obligations exist at both
the national-level and the international-level and, moreover, both sets of
obligations are interdependent and interrelated. Irrespective of whether or not
they are responsible for climate change, all states nevertheless retain the legal
obligation to pursue the widest possible enjoyment of human rights for their
people. However, at the same time and to an equal degree, states also have an
extraterritorial legal duty not to interfere with the enjoyment of human rights
in other countries (i.e., to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels) and
to help vulnerable states adapt to the adverse impacts of inevitable climate
change. The OHCHR Report clearly suggests that these two sets of
obligations-national and international-must be viewed together in the
context of climate change if universal human rights are to be fulfilled. Climate
change cannot be used as an excuse by states not to pursue the full enjoyment
of human rights, but equally the fulfilment of human rights by vulnerable states

1 Id. 99. OHCHR made this point in the very last paragraph of the report in order to
emphasize its importance.
62 Limon, supra note 4, at 455.
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will only be possible in a permissive international environment in which all
states also abide by their extraterritorial duties and obligations.
IV. RESOLUTION 10/4

On March 6, 2009, during the Tenth Session of the Human Rights
Council, the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Ms. Kyung-wha Kang, introduced report A/HRC/10/61 on the relationship
between climate change and human rights.63
Only a few states responded immediately (i.e., during the Tenth Session)
to the report. Other interested delegations had already informed the lead
sponsor, the Maldives, that the importance of the issue warranted a dedicated
half-day Council debate on the subject (during the Tenth Session the report
would only be considered en masse with a range of other unrelated OHCHR
reports) and that they would withhold their comments until such a debate could
be convened.
Those states that did respond to the report during the Tenth Session were
Bhutan, Canada, Costa Rica, Israel, the Maldives, the Philippines, and
Switzerland.' 4 Although small in number, these interventions already provided
63 Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Comm'r for Human Rights, Introduction of Reports by

the Secretary-General and the High Comm'r for Human Rights at the Tenth Session of the
Human Rights Council (Mar. 6, 2009) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalofInternationaland
ComparativeLaw).
6 See, e.g., Doma Tshering, Deputy Permanent Representative ofBhutan, Statement During
General Debate Under Agenda Item 3 at the Tenth Session of the Human Rights Council
(Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journalof Internationaland Comparative Law)
[hereinafter Statement of Bhutan, Tenth Session]; Shazra Abdul Sattar, First Sec'y, Maldives
Permanent Mission to the United Nations at Geneva, Statement During General Debate Under
Agenda Item 3 at the Tenth Session of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with
the Georgia Journal of Internationaland Comparative Law) [hereinafter Statement of the
Maldives, Tenth Session]; Jeffrey Heaton, Second Sec'y, Can. Permanent Mission to the United
Nations at Geneva, Statement During General Debate Under Agenda Item 3 at the Tenth Session
of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 16,2009) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalofInternational
and Comparative Law) [hereinafter Statement of Canada, Tenth Session]; Jesus Enrique G.
Garcia II, Second Sec'y, Phil. Permanent Mission to the United Nations at Geneva, Statement
During General Debate Under Agenda Item 2 at the Tenth Session of the Human Rights Council
(Mar. 6, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journalof International and Comparative Law)
[hereinafter Statement of the Philippines, Tenth Session]. The World Bank also made an
intervention. Richard S. Newfarmer, Special Representative to the United Nations and the
World Trade Org., The World Bank, Statement During General Debate Under Agenda Item 3
of the Tenth Session of the Human Rights Council (Mar. 12, 2009) (on file with the Georgia
Journalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw).
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a sense of the range of views in the Council chamber on the three core
questions identified by the OHCHR Report.
On the presence and nature of the relationship between climate change and
human rights, it was already becoming evident that a clear majority view was
evolving not only on the idea that a relationship existed between the two but
also on the character of that relationship. This emerging consensus was neatly
summed up by Bhutan: (1) "[c]limate change both directly and indirectly
impacts the effective enjoyment of human rights including... the right to life,
the right to adequate housing, the right to adequate food, the means to
subsistence, the right to water, and the right to health";65 (2) "those who
contribute least to the causes of climate change, and who can least afford to
meet the challenges and costs, are among the most vulnerable to its adverse
effects";66 and (3) climate change can and will lead to large-scale human rights
crises through, interalia, sea-level rise, flooding, and drought.67 Similarly, the
Maldives noted in its statement that the OHCHR Report "provides definitive
recognition that climate change has important negative implications for a widerange of internationally-protected human rights. Moreover, the Report
demonstrates that the impacts of global warming fall heaviest on the rights of
those people who are already vulnerable due to geography, poverty, age, or
gender factors. 68
Notwithstanding, as had been apparent a year earlier, during the Seventh
Council Session, a small number of industrialized countries continued to take
a much more limited, cautious, and nuanced view of the extent of any
relationship between climate change and human rights. Specifically, these
countries promoted the view that any relationship is at most a loose causal one
and is a statement of fact rather than a statement of law. For example, Canada
repeated the mantra, used in its national submission to the OHCHR Report,
that "situations may occur in which environmental degradation amplified by
climate change may set conditions that impact on the effective enjoyment of
human rights"; but that, "Canada is concerned with assertions in the report by
the OHCHR regarding possible linkages between climate change and human
rights obligations, in the absence of consensus on these issues by States."69 In
other words, climate change may, through various intermediary steps,

Statement of Bhutan, Tenth Session, supra note 64.
Id.
67 Id.
68 Statement of the Maldives, Tenth Session, supra note 64.
69 Statement of Canada, Tenth Session, supra note 64.
65
66
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influence the enjoyment of human rights, but this is no more than an
observation; there is no formal link whatsoever between human rights law and
climate change law.
In contrast to the broad convergence on the question of the relationship
between climate change and human rights, states showed themselves to hold
widely differing views on whether climate change impacts might be considered
a human rights violation and on the scope and nature of human rights
obligations as they pertain to global warming.
On the question of whether climate change constitutes a violation of human
rights, the Philippines found significant fault with the OHCHR supposition that
" '[t]he physical impacts of global warming cannot easily be classified as
human rights violations, not the least because climate change-related harm
often cannot be [sic] clearly be attributed to acts or omissions of specific
States.' "70 The Philippines' objection focused on the claim by OHCHR that
climate change-related harm cannot be clearly attributed to acts or omissions
of specific states-i.e., it is difficult to attribute responsibility for a human
rights harm caused by climate change.7 According to the Philippines, such an
argument is not only wrong-it is possible to apportion responsibility for
climate change in both a contemporary and historical sense.72 Indeed, the
Philippines argues that such an exercise lies at the very heart of the
international climate change negotiations, and it is possible to state
categorically that a given phenomenon such as sea-level rise is caused by
anthropogenic climate change.73 However, it is also dangerous as it calls into
question the fundamental basis of international efforts to tackle the problem
(i.e., common but differentiated responsibility). "[T]he concern of developing
countries, particularly small island states," argued the Philippines,
is not the singular effect of a specific act or omission that need[s]
to be traced to a specific state but to the cumulative effect of
climate change, such as rising sea level, that can be attributed to
the accumulation of acts and omissions that can be historically
traced and measured through the carbon footprints of states.74

70 Statement
71
72

Id.
Id.

73 Id.

74Id.

of the Philippines, Tenth Session, supra note 64.
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On the question of the nature of human rights obligations vis-A-vis climate
change, at both the national and international level, there was also a clear
disagreement between developing and developed states on the correct balance
between the two levels of obligation.
For their part, developing countries, such as Bhutan, the Maldives, and the
Philippines, argued, in their interventions, that if states, led by industrialized
nations, do not meet their international legal obligation not to interfere with the
enjoyment of human rights elsewhere (i.e., to mitigate emissions to safe levels)
and to help the "victims" of the problem adapt to the changing environment
(through international commitments on adaptation), then one cannot
reasonably expect vulnerable states to bear sole responsibility for fulfilling
human rights through domestic remedy. In this regard, the Philippines asked:
"What domestic remedy or relief can the governments of small island states
offer their citizens against the onslaught of rising sea level?"75 Building on
this theme, Bhutan described its strong and successful environmental
protection policies including in the area of climate change mitigation (for
example, the law requires that over 60% of the country remain forested at all
times). However, it notes that despite this commitment to create a natural
environment conducive to the full enjoyment of human rights as well as
"tangible even disproportionate contributions to international mitigation
efforts, Bhutan is not spared the adverse effects of global climate change"
including the retreat of glaciers and related "Glacial Lake Outburst Floods"
which threaten the lives, livelihoods and welfare of a significant part of the
Bhutanese population.7 6
These vulnerable states therefore called for a much greater emphasis on the
international obligation of states, especially industrialized states, to cooperate
internationally to arrest dangerous interference with the global climate and
thus to protect human rights. As the Maldives clearly stated: "international
cooperation to mitigate and adapt to climate change is not merely desirable, it
is in fact a legal obligation under international human rights law."77
This emphasis on international legal obligations to address an international
problem was strongly contested by Canada which argued that: "It is the
primary responsibility of States to promote and protect the human rights of
individuals under their respective jurisdictions .
78 ,"In
the event that the

75 Id.

76 Statement of Bhutan, Tenth Session, supra note 64.

- Statement of the Maldives, Tenth Session, supra note 64.
78 Statement of Canada, Tenth Session, supra note 64.
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human rights of a person within Canada's borders are endangered due to a
situation arising in whole or in part from environmental degradation and/or the
impacts of climate change, existing legal protections, policies and programmes
would apply."7 9 To demonstrate its point, the Canadian delegation addressed
the argument, from the OHCHR Report, that extreme weather events may pose
a direct threat to the right to life. "[I]n our view, it's the ability and
willingness of States to effectively prepare, prevent and respond to natural
hazards that ensures the protection of basic human rights.""
In order to officially respond to the OHCHR Report, and after considering
the initial responses of states, the Maldives tabled a follow-up resolution to
7/23 on human rights and climate change. Resolution 10/4 was adopted by the
Council on March 25, 2009 by consensus and with eighty-nine co-sponsors."'
While, Resolution 10/42 is necessarily (in view of the deep political
sensitivities around the subject) silent on the question of whether the physical
impacts of climate change violate fundamental human rights, it does address
and seek to draw clear conclusions regarding the other key legal questions
raised by the OHCHR Report.83
First, on the relationship between climate change and human rights,
Resolution 10/4 clearly states (in preambular paragraph 7) that "climate
change-related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and indirect,
for the effective enjoyment of human rights."84 It then offers a definitive list
of those rights most affected by climate change, namely: the right to life, the
right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the
right to adequate housing, the right to self-determination, and human rights
obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation. The
resolution also recalls that "in no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence."8 5
While the list may not seem extraordinary (it replicates the list proposed in
the OHCHR Report-with the addition of reference to deprivation of means

79 Id.

80 Id.

s'A list of co-sponsors is on file with the author.
82 H.R.C. Res. 10/4, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (Nov. 9, 2009) (preparedby Elchin
Amirbayov) [hereinafter UNHRC 10/4].
83 Id. at pmbl.
Id. at pmbl. para. 7. Attempts by the U.S. and Canada to weaken preambular paragraph
7 of Resolution 10/4 by saying that "climate change-related effects may have a range of
implications..." were rejected by the main co-sponsors.
85 Id.
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of subsistence), it is nevertheless significant that Council Members agreed to
its inclusion in the adopted resolution, as it represents a definitive acceptance
that there is a clear relationship between climate change and specific
internationally protected human rights. Such universal recognition had not
been possible a year previously during negotiations for Resolution 7/23. A
second important point to note is that states, especially developed states,
agreed to the inclusion of reference in the list to the right to life and the right
to self-determination. Only nine days earlier, on March 16,2009, Canada had
openly argued to the Council against the notion that climate change impacts,
such as more frequent extreme weather, may pose a direct threat to the right
to life-stating instead that "it's the ability and willingness of States to
effectively prepare, prevent and respond to natural hazards that ensures the
protection of basic human rights." 6 Similarly, there did not appear to be a
clear view among states, in the run-up to the vote on Resolution 10/4, that
there was any solid legal link between climate change and the right to selfdetermination. The OHCHR Report states that: "Sea level rise and extreme
weather events related to climate change are threatening the habitability and,
in the longer term, the territorial existence of a number of low-lying island
States.""7 Such impacts "would have implications for the right to selfdetermination." 8 However, not all states agreed with this reading during
initial consultations on the draft resolution, with some arguing that the right to
self-determination is a collective right of peoples to freely determine their
political status and pursue their development within a defined geographical
space, rather than a right that can be applied to peoples' collective right to
continue to live in a disappearinggeographical space.
In addition to clarifying which human rights are most implicated by climate
change, Resolution 10/4 also dealt with the issue of which population groups
are most affected. In preambular paragraph 8, the Council recognizes that
"while these implications affect individuals and communities around the
world, the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by those
segments of the population who are already in vulnerable situations owing to
factors such as geography, poverty, gender, age, indigenous or minority status
and disability."8 9 Again, this list mainly borrows from the OHCHR Report,
although with the additions of geographic vulnerability (a crucial omission in

8 Statement by Canada, Tenth Session, supranote 64.
87 OHCHR Report, supra note 19, 40.
88 Id.
89 UNHRC 10/4, supra note 82, at 12, at pmbl. par. 8.

2010]

CLIMATE CHANGE: OBLIGATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

565

the OHCHR Report) and indigenous status. Like the OHCHR Report,
Resolution 10/4 does not take the next step of taking this analysis and placing
it in the context of "climate injustice"-i.e., noting that those communities
least responsible for climate change and least able to adapt are the ones that are
also the most vulnerable to its impacts.
After clarifying the existence and nature of the relationship between climate
change and human rights, Resolution 10/4 moves on to tackle the question of
national versus international human rights obligations in the context of climate
change.
Regarding national-level obligations, the resolution takes up the argument,
made by OHCHR, that the observance of procedural rights, such as access to
information and decision-making as well as of core human rights principles,
such as equality and non-discrimination, are crucial in order to effectively
address climate change. A rather vaguely worded preambular paragraph 10
affirms that "human rights obligations and commitments have the potential to
inform and strengthen international and national policymaking in the area of
climate change, promoting policy coherence, legitimacy and sustainable
outcomes."9 An early draft of the resolution was more explicit on national
obligations in the area of procedural rights, affirming that "access to
information and participation in decision-making are critical to efforts to
address climate change."'" However, this paragraph was deleted at the
insistence of several developing countries which felt the resolution was too
heavily weighted towards national obligations over international (i.e.,
developed country) obligations.
Almost inevitably, considering that it was the most significant and
controversial part of the OHCHR Report, the preambular paragraph in
Resolution 10/4 dealing with international human rights obligations in the
context of climate change was the most fiercely contested part of the
Resolution. The first draft of the resolution borrowed exact wording from the
OHCHR Report, stating that "international human rights law complements the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change by underlining that
international cooperation is not only expedient but also a human rights
obligation and that its central objective is the realisation of human rights."92

90 Id. at pmbl. para. 10.

9'H.R.C. Res. 10/4 (unpublished First Draft on file with the Georgia Journal of
Internationaland ComparativeLaw).
92 Id.
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However, developed countries strongly objected to any suggestion of the
existence of an international-level obligation to protect human rights as this
would, they feared, dilute the state-centric nature of the international human
rights protection system. The adopted draft, therefore, makes clear that
international cooperation is significant in the context of climate change and
human rights insofar as it provides an enabling environment which supports
national efforts for the realization of human rights. What is more, the
resolution only describes such international cooperation as "important"93 rather
than as a legal obligation.94
After attempting this initial delineation of key aspects and implications of
the relationship between climate change and human rights, Resolution 10/4 put
forward a number of operative paragraphs designed to further refine the
international human rights machinery's understanding of that relationship and
to explore ways in which the interface might be leveraged in order to support
international human rights policy and climate change policy. The most
important of the proposed steps were the call (in operative paragraph 3) for all
relevant human rights Special Procedures (independent experts) to "give
consideration to the issue of climate change within their respective
mandates";95 and the Council's decision (in operative paragraph 1) to "hold a
panel discussion on the relationship between climate change and human rights
at its eleventh session."96
V. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL DEBATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE

On June 15, 2009, the Human Rights Council's Eleventh Regular Session
dedicated a half day to an interactive panel debate on the relationship between
climate change and human rights. The debate was introduced by the Deputy
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Head of Legal Affairs at the
UNFCCC Secretariat, Feng Gao.9 7 Then, after hearing four expert

"' The third draft ofthe resolution suggested alternatives such as "expedient" or "a moral and
legal imperative" but these were not accepted. H.R.C. Res. 10/4 (unpublished Third Draft on
file with the GeorgiaJournalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw).
9 The Maldives could have insisted on the inclusion of a reference to international
cooperation as a human rights obligation and pushed the resolution through with a vote.
However, it was considered more important to secure a consensus document.
" UNHRC 10/4, supra note 82, 3.
96 Id. 3.
97 Feng Gao, Dir. for Legal Affairs, UNFCCC Secretariat, Panel on Human Rights and
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presentations on different aspects of the relationship,98 thirty-seven states and
four NGOs9 9 took the floor to offer their views and ask questions. Although
a wide range of issues and points were raised, much of the discussion once
again revolved around the three core questions identified in the OHCHR
Report.
A. Is There a RelationshipBetween Climate Changeand Human Rights, and
If so, What Is the Nature of That Relationship?
First and foremost, the debate demonstrated that a remarkable
transformation of opinion had taken place between March 2008, when
Resolution 7/23 had been negotiated and adopted, and June 2009, when the
issue was finally considered in-depth by states. During the Seventh Session of
the Council in March 2008, a wide range of states refused to accept that there
was any relationship between climate change and human rights, arguing
instead that they were two completely separate bodies of law and that climate
change policy must be dealt with by the UNFCCC, and human rights policy by
the Human Rights Council. Even the seemingly innocuous language used in
preambular paragraph 1 of Resolution 7/23-that climate change "has

Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file
with the GeorgiaJournalofInternationaland ComparativeLaw). The mere presence of such
a senior UNFCCC Secretariat official was significant. It was illustrative both of heightened
contact and cooperation between UNFCCC Secretariat and OHCHR (which was also recognized
in operative paragraph four of Resolution 10/4), and of the heightened interest among the climate
change community about the potential benefits of applying human rights principles to climate
change policy.
9 Atiq Rahman, Executive Director, Bangladesh Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Panel on Human
Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council: Implications
of Anthropogenic Climate Change on Human Rights (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia
Journal of Internationaland Comparative Law); Dalindyebo Shabalala, Managing Att'y,
Geneva Office of the Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law (CIEL), Panel on Human Rights and Climate
Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law); Raquel Rolnik, United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard
of Living and on the Right to Non-discrimination in This Context, Panel on Human Rights and
Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file
with the GeorgiaJournalof Internationaland Comparative Law); John Knox, Wake Forest
University, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human
Rights Council: Climate Change as a Challenge to Human Rights Law (June 15, 2009) (on file
with the GeorgiaJournalofInternationaland ComparativeLaw).
" Limited for reasons of time.
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implications for the full enjoyment of human rights"'- was the subject of
fierce debate. In the end, it was only accepted by the Council because it was
vague enough to mean different things to different delegations and because, at
the time, the United States'0 ' was not a member.
However, by June 2009, no delegation argued with the notion that climate2
change has implications for a wide-range of explicitly identified,'1
internationally-protected human rights; that already vulnerable "climate
frontline" countries are most at risk (and the least able to adapt); and that the
human rights impacts do not fall evenly across a given population, but rather
target marginalised or vulnerable groups, such as women and children.0 3 For
0 UNHRC 7/23, supra note 16, at pmbl. para. 1.
10' Under the Bush Administration, the United States was not a member of the Human Rights

Council, UN Human Rights Council, Membership of the Human Rights Council, http://www2.
ohchr.org/englishlbodies/hrcouncil/membership.htm (last visited July 14, 2010).
"02 In addition to the list of rights cited in Resolution 10/4, many states (e.g., India,
Philippines, and Brazil) also used the debate to emphasize the impacts of climate change on the
right to development. Rajiv Kumar Chander, Permanent Representative of India to the United
Nations at Geneva, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the
Human Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalof Internationaland
ComparativeLaw) [hereinafter Statement of India, Eleventh Session]; Jesus Enrique G. Garcia
II, Second Sec'y, Phil. Permanent Mission to the United Nations at Geneva, Panel on Human
Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15,
2009) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw) [hereinafter
Statement of the Philippines, Eleventh Session]; Joao Emesto Christ6folo, Permanent Mission
of Braz. to the United Nations at Geneva, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change of the
Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia
Journalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw).
103 Moreover, it was noted during the debate that this emerging consensus in the Human
Rights Council was being mirrored in the UNFCCC process as well as other related fora. For
example, the Deputy High Commissioner pointed out in her opening statement that
the text on long-term cooperative action [prepared by the Chair of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA)] includes
wording from Human Rights Council resolution 10/4.
Paragraph 2 ... highlights that "the adverse effects of climate change will be
felt most acutely by those segments of the population who are already in
vulnerable situations owing to such factors as geography, poverty, gender,
age, indigenous or minority status and disability."
Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Comm'r for Human Rights, Opening Remarks at Panel on
Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Right Council
(June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw).
Similarly, Azerbaijan noted that a joint statement by the eighteen organizations of the InterAgency Standing Committee (including UNHCR, IOM, and OCHA) published on June 8,2009,
"emphasizes that any new agreement on climate change ... should take the human rights
dimension into account." Emil Aghaahmadov, Delegation ofAzer., Panel on Human Rights and
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example, Mauritius stated that: "It is [now] an undeniable fact that climate
change poses a direct and major threat to a wide range of universally
recognized human rights"; °4 while the Maldives commented: "[t]here is now
no doubt, legal or otherwise, that climate change has wide-ranging and deep
negative implications for the full enjoyment of human rights, especially
amongst vulnerable population groups."'0 5 Nor was this shift in perceptions
limited to developing states. Australia, for example "recognise[d] this
significant threat to human rights posed by climate change."'0 6
What is more, an impressive number of states"0 7 accepted and even
promoted the idea, during the June debate, that the various aspects of the
relationship between climate change and human rights could and should be
placed within an overall concept of "climate injustice."'0 8 Thailand, for
example, noted that, "[t]he impacts ofclimate change are unevenly distributed.
They disproportionately affect certain regions and countries, which have
generally contributed the least to human-induced climate change"; °9 while the

Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file
with the Georgia Journalof Internationaland Comparative Law) [hereinafter Statement of
Azerbaijan, Eleventh Session].
"1o
Subhas Gujadhur, Second Sec'y, Permanent Mission of Mauritius to the United Nations
at Geneva, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human
Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journal of International and
ComparativeLaw) (hereinafter Statement of Mauritius, Eleventh Session].
105Shazra Abdul Sattar, First Sec'y, Maldives Permanent Mission to the United Nations at
Geneva, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human
Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law) [hereinafter Statement of the Maldives, Eleventh Session].
"06Philip Kimpton, First Sec'y, Austl. Permanent Mission to the United Nations at Geneva,
Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights
Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalof Internationaland Comparative
Law).
107 See Pitchayaphant Charnbhumidol, Minister Counselor, Permanent Mission of Thail. to
the United Nations at Geneva, Panel on Human Rights and Global Climate Change at the
Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Counsel (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia
JournalofInternationaland ComparativeLaw) [hereinafter Statement of Thailand, Eleventh
Session]; Doma Tshering, Deputy Permanent Rep. of Bhutan to the United Nations at Geneva,
Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights
Counsel (June 15, 2009) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalofInternationaland Comparative
Law) [hereinafter Statement of Bhutan, Eleventh Session]; Statement of the Philippines,
Eleventh Session, supra note 102.
108See supra text accompanying note 35 (defining climate injustice).
"oStatement of Thailand, Eleventh Session, supranote 107.
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responsible and the most
Philippines argued that "[i]t is not fair that the least
'" 10
change."
climate
from
most
the
suffer
vulnerable
Despite progress in forming a consensus on the broad parameters of the
relationship between climate change and human rights, significant differences
in emphasis nevertheless persisted in June 2009, especially regarding the legal
implications of the relationship. In particular, while many developing and
vulnerable states argued that human rights law creates legal obligations which
are applicable to international action on the issue of climate change, developed
countries by-and-large continued to insist that climate change and human rights
inhabit two separate and very different bodies of law with no formal
connection between the two. For example, during the panel debate, the U.S.
delegation agreed that "climate change . . . has implications for the full

enjoyment of human rights" but at the same time noted that "there is no direct
formal relationship between climate change and human rights as a legal
matter.""' Similarly, Canada argued that situations may occur in which
environmental degradation amplified by climate change may set conditions
that impact on the effective enjoyment of human rights but went on to make
clear that there is no legal link between the UNFCCC and the international
human rights conventions." 12
These differences in emphasis were amplified in the context of the other
two key questions posed by the OHCHR Report, namely whether climate
change impacts constitute a human rights violation, and what human rights
obligations exist, at national and international-levels, in relation to climate
change.
B. Does Climate Change Constitute a Violation of Human Rights, Especially
the Rights of Vulnerable People?
As had been the case throughout the evolution of the human rights, climate
change issue within the Human Rights Council, during the June 2009 panel

..
0 Statement of the Philippines, Eleventh Session, supra note 102.
. Anna Chambers, Delegation of the U.S., Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at
the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia
Journalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw) [hereinafter Statement of the U.S., Eleventh
Session].
112 Webcast: Victoria Berry, Permanent Mission of Can. to the United Nations at Geneva,
Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights
(United Nations Human Rights Council, June 15, 2009), http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/arc
hive.asp?go=090615 [hereinafter Statement of Canada, Eleventh Session].
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debate, states largely avoided the question of whether the physical impacts of
climate change might be construed as a human rights violation in the strict
legal sense.
Although OHCHR, in its report, focused on the legal difficulties inherent
in labeling climate change a "human rights violation," the more pertinent
consideration from the viewpoint of states was always political. To begin
with, the main cosponsor, the Maldives, consistently avoided use of the word
"violation" on the grounds that the aim of their initiative was to draw attention
to the human suffering caused by climate change and to increase the pressure
on states to pursue an effective negotiated settlement. Pursuing a more
litigious strategy was never a preference. Secondly, states were also aware that
pursuing such a path might well lead to a dead end-even if it was able to
prove that a human rights violation had occurred, what could a country like the
Maldives realistically do about it?" 3
Notwithstanding this general reluctance to address the issue of violation of
human rights law (as had been the case during the shorter discussion on human
rights and climate change during the Tenth Session in March 2009), some
states did use the June panel debate to question the assertion made by OHCHR,
that "[t]he physical impacts of global warming cannot easily be classified as
often
human rights violations, not least because climate change-related harm
'' 4
cannot clearly be attributed to acts or omissions of specific States." 1
The strongest opponent of this reading of the situation was Pakistan." 5
Pakistan argued that it is possible to establish responsibility for climate change
and to link a derogation of this responsibility to human rights harm, stating
"we believe it is important and possible to 'disentangle' [the] basics of this
causal relationship.""' 6 According to Pakistan, responsibility for climate
change can be easily determined at two levels-historical responsibility and
failure to comply with international legal obligations. Regarding the former,
"3 For an informative description of the difficulties facing a state considering pursuing such
a path, see the case of Tuvalu. See Akiko Okamatsu, Problems and Prospects of International
Legal Disputes on Climate Change (Dec. 2,2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
Tom Price, The Canary is
www.sprep.org/att/IRC/eCOPIES/countries/Tuvalu/47.pdf;
Drowning: Tiny Tuvalu, GLOBAL POL'Y F., Dec. 3, 2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org/compo
nent/content/article/172/30312.html.
114 OHCHR Report, supra note 19,
96.
..
5 Marghoob Saleem Butt, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Pak. to the United Nations at
Geneva, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human
Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journal of International and
ComparativeLaw) [hereinafter Statement of Pakistan, Eleventh Session].
116 Id.
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Pakistan argued that "[t]he principle cause of climate change is emissions by
and from developed countries, representing less than one fifth of the world's
population but responsible for almost three quarters of all historic emissions.
On per person basis, their historical emissions are more than ten times those
of the developing countries." ' 7 Regarding the latter, Pakistan notes that those
same countries which bear a historic responsibility for climate change
"continu[e] to violate their international obligations under the [UNFCCC] and
its Kyoto protocol. None of the countries which assumed binding obligations
to reduce emissions contained in the Annexes of the UNFCCC [and] Kyoto
Protocol has [sic] fulfilled its [international] obligations."'" 8 Regarding harm,
Pakistan argued that the victims of climate change are also easy to identify and
are mainly "people and communities in the developing countries which did
little to cause climate change. ' "
Thus, according to Pakistan: "[C]ertain countries have imposed climate
change and consequently [have] created conditions of violations of human
rights in the developing countries."'' 0
India also questioned the idea that it is difficult to assign responsibility and,
like Pakistan, posited that responsibility can be determined on the basis of both
historic emissions and of failure to abide by legal (UNFCCC) obligations on
contemporary emissions:121
The present crisis that we are now discussing is the result of
activity over the past two centuries, where the contribution of
developing countries had been minimal ....
It is a matter of concern that despite the targets for reductions
in emissions that [developed] countries assumed under the Kyoto
Protocol, there are few signs that these will be met. The question
of accountability for failure to implement legally binding and
internationally agreed provisions relating to emissions reduction
targets needs to be looked at closely.'22

117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.

120 Id.
121

Statement of India, Eleventh Session, supra note 102.

122 Id.
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The Philippines had already made similar arguments to Pakistan and India
during the March 200924 debate 23 and once again returned to the theme of
responsibility in June: 1
While we take note of the analytical study of the OHCHR ... we

feel that it did not fully take into account the important concepts
of international responsibility, historical responsibility,
international obligations, and common, but differentiated
responsibilities .... Scientific evidence tells us that the carbon
footprints of states and their accumulated effects over time have
produced the climate change crisis. 20% of the world's
population is responsible for over 70% of global emissions.12 5
C. Irrespective of Whether Climate Change Represents a Human Rights
Violation, What Are States' National-level and International-levelHuman
Rights ObligationsPertainingto Climate Change?
The major division between states during the June 2009 panel debate was
on the question of the relative weight of national human rights obligations in
the context of the climate crisis as against extraterritorial obligations. As was
the case during similar debates in the Council focusing on the human rights
implications of other global crises, including the financial crisis and the food
crisis, the fault line between states ran roughly along developed-developing
country lines.
For their part, most (but not all) developed countries insisted that while the
climate crisis may be international in scope, human rights promotion and
protection is the sole purview of national governments vis-a-vis their citizens
and others within their jurisdiction. It is therefore up to individual states to
promote and protect the human rights of their people in the face of such crises,
irrespective of the additional burden placed upon them. Moreover, if all states
abide by their national human rights obligations at the national-level, it would
go a long way to solving important problems at the international-level. For
example, Canada restated its view that even in the context of global climate
change, states have the primary responsibility to protect the rights of their

Statement of the Philippines, Tenth Session, supra note 64.
Statement of the Philippines, Eleventh Session, supra note 102.
125 Id.
3
124
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people,' 26 while Germany argued that "[a]ddressing climate change, and the
consequences thereof, is the primary responsibility of States. Of course,
climate change is a global problem requiring a global solution. But every
global solution consists of individual commitments from every State to deal
with the issue at hand."' 2 7 Building on the theme of national responsibility for
human rights and the view that by complying with their human rights
obligations at the domestic level states will ultimately solve the problem of
climate change at a global-level, many developed country delegations used
their interventions to elaborate on the ways in which this might be achieved.
Essentially, these states made two arguments. First, the U.S. argued that
states which have a strong human rights record, with independent democratic
institutions, a free press, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and active
civil society, will be inherently more climate resilient than other less fortunate
countries.
We acknowledge that these issues [of human rights and climate
change] do overlap and efforts to address climate change and to
advance human rights have a number of common and mutually
reinforcing elements.
Notably, the United States considers that the attributes that
contribute to climate solutions-good governance, transparency,
and rule of law-are also essential to the promotion of
democracy and human rights.' 28
Second, developed countries maintained that human rights obligations and
principles (such as equity, non-discrimination, access to information, and
access to decision-making) represent important tools in the development of
better and more effective climate change policies at the domestic-level. For
example, the U.K. said that, "[t]he existing international human rights
framework offers a powerful tool to assist States in overcoming the human
impacts of some of these challenges, providing for protection of the most
marginalised and vulnerable, and emphasising participation, transparency and
accountability in deciding how to respond,"' 29 while the European Commission
126Statement of Canada, Eleventh Session, supra note 112.
27Anke Konrad, Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations at Geneva, Panel on

Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council
(June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw).
128 Statement of U.S., Eleventh Session, supra note 111.
129 Peter Gooderham, Permanent Representative of the U.K- to the United Nations in Geneva,
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asked the expert panelists to elaborate on the extent to which human rights law
can help national climate change responses by focusing on vulnerable groups
within a population and by improving access to information and justice in
environmental matters, and participation in decision-making. 3 ° Finally, the
U.S. continued its theme of solving climate change through democratic
"business-as-usual" when it concluded that: "Certainly, governments should
be mindful of their international human rights obligations when considering
any significant domestic policy initiatives, including those related to climate
change.... ""'
There are a number of problems with this developed country perspective on
the nature of human rights obligations as they pertain to climate change. First,
looking at the U.S. argument about democratic societies being better able to
respond to climate change, it is important to note that vulnerable countries like
the Maldives or Tuvalu can have the finest and most democratic institutions
in the world as well as the most robust human rights protection mechanisms,
but this would not stop the sea from rising, their land from being flooded or,
ultimately, their territory from being lost. Moreover, turning this argument
around, it is equally clear that the United States, which is often seen (and is
certainly projected) as a model democratic society built upon a strong human
rights framework, is, in terms of cumulative emissions over time, the state that
has on its own done the most to cause the global climate crisis. A strong
Executive, a democratic Congress, independent courts, free press, and strong
civil society have not resulted in the country showing any kind of leadership
or foresight on the question of climate change; in fact it could be argued that
the opposite is the case.
Second, although the argument of the U.K. and others that human rights
principles can be applied to the evolution and implementation of domestic
climate change policy in order to improve the policy's quality, effectiveness,
coherence, and sustainability, is more attractive than that offered by the U.S.,
it only runs so far. Certainly, being mindful of human rights obligations such
as equity and non-discrimination will help to ensure that adaptation support is

Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights
Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalof Internationaland Comparative
Law).
130 Joalle Hivonner, First Counselor, Eur. Comm'n Delegation to the United Nations in
Geneva, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human
Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journal of Internationaland
Comparative Law).
' Statement of the U.S., Eleventh Session, supra note 111.
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directed to those in society who need it most, while access to information and
decision-making can help the victims of global warming understand national
mitigation policy and exert pressure for improvement. However, it is equally
clear that good domestic policy alone cannot protect the human rights of a
population against climate change. The Maldives, for example, has a National
Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) developed in broad consultation with
affected groups in society;'3 2 but irrespective of the plan's merits, it cannot
conceivably protect the human rights of 300,000 people spread across 200 tiny
coral islands. Or, turning to access to information and decision-making, the
voices of vulnerable groups in the Maldives have been able to exert pressure
on the central government which has, in turn, committed to an ambitious
mitigation policy aimed at achieving carbon neutrality by 2020.133 However,
such a policy, irrespective of its qualitative value, will have little or no impact
on global emissions if the U.S. continues to pollute at current levels.
What is more, the "good policy" argument of the U.K. et al. assumes that
vulnerable states have the resources to implement those policies-either in the
area of mitigation or adaption. Yet this is not the case. As Azerbaijan clearly
noted: "[A] lack of resources [means that developing countries cannot] deal
effectively with climate change" and thus cannot fully protect and promote
human rights. 34
' To complicate the picture even more, as argued by Pakistan,
the ability of developing countries to adapt to climate change and thus to
protect the rights of their people is, in the case of climate change, dependent
on the degree to which developed country Parties comply with their
international obligations under the UNFCCC on mitigation, the provision of
financial resources and technology transfer.'3 5 To highlight this point, Pakistan
drew attention to Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC which states that "[tihe extent to
which developing country Parties will effectively implement their
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments."' 36

132

Republic of Maldives, National Adaption Plan of Action (Draft for Comments, Nov. 19,

2006), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/docs/submissions/MaldivesNation
al-Adaptation Plan-of Action.pdf.
"' Letter from the Republic of Maldives to Yvo de Boer, Executive Sec'y, UNFCCC,
Submission of the Maldives (Jan. 29, 2010), availableat http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/applic
ation/pdf/maldivescphaccord-app2.pdf.
134 Statement of Azerbaijan, Eleventh Session, supra note 103.
35 Statement of Pakistan, Eleventh Session, supra note 115.
136 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4.7, openedforsignature
May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
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What is clearly missing from the analyses presented by these developed
states "37
' is, of course, the importance, in the case of protecting human rights in
the face of global warming, of combining national-level human rights
obligations with international-level obligations.
The importance of recognizing and enforcing extraterritorial human rights
obligations in the face of climate change was made, in varying formulae, by
almost all developing country delegations that took part in the debate, as well
as by some more progressive developed country representations. Most vocal
were small vulnerable states which, regardless of the merit of their domestic
institutions and laws can, in practical terms, do little or nothing on their own
to solve the problem of climate change.
Bangladesh offered the most frank rebuttal of the myopic assessment
offered by industrialized states:
It is often said that human rights protection is the responsibility
of the national authorities-basically downgrading international
cooperation. Even in dealing with the climate change, which is
a global issue, too much emphasis is put on national
As has been said by the Deputy High
responsibility.
Commissioner [in her introductory remarks], the least developed
countries and small island states will be the worst affected by
climate change although they have contributed least to global
greenhouse gas emissions. It is not only unfair but also
unjustified to hold these countries responsible fully for protecting
their people.'3 8
Many vulnerable states were quick to emphasize that the need to give
greater emphasis to international-level obligations should not be seen as
commensurate with a reluctance to accept and honor national-level obligations.
Indeed many developing countries (e.g., Thailand) used their statements to
explain how they and others should apply human rights principles, such as the

"' Most such states (e.g., the U.K.) chose to ignore the international perspective entirely,
while others such as the U.S. chose to openly discount it: "[T]he United States does not consider
that human rights law provides an optimal framework for addressing climate change
internationally." Statement of the U.S., Eleventh Session, supra note 111.
' Webcast: Mustafizur Rahman, Charg6 d'affaires, Permanent Mission of Bangl. to the
United Nations, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the
Human Rights Council (United Nations Human Rights Council, June 15,2009), http://www.un.
org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go-090615.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 38:543

elimination of discrimination and the empowerment of vulnerable groups,
more robustly to national climate change policy in order to make those policies
more effective. 39 Others, such as Mauritius, openly welcomed national-level
obligations and extolled the value of doing so:
[A] human rights dimension ... introduces an accountability
framework . . . by holding governments, the duty-bearers,
accountable to reducing the vulnerability of their citizens to
global warming and by assisting them in adapting to the
consequences. A focus on human rights also means that the
views of those who will be disproportionately affected by climate
change-the poor, vulnerable and marginalized-must have to be
duly taken into account in policy responses devised to address the
causes and consequences of global warming. 4 '
However, while accepting the importance of domestic action, developing
states were also robust in their defense of the idea that in order to effectively
protect human rights in the face of climate change, observance of nationallevel commitments must necessarily be combined with respect, on the part of
the international community, for extraterritorial human rights
obligations-most particularly the obligation "to refrain from taking action
which interferes with the enjoyment of human rights in other countries, and to
take steps through international cooperation to facilitate the fulfillment of
those rights."''
For example, the Maldives, speaking on behalf of twelve Small Island
Developing States, emphasized the fact that they were committed through
domestic policies to address the human rights implications of climate change,
[h]owever, with emission levels continuing to rise and
considering the barriers preventing direct and simplified access
to adaptation funding, as well as the current inadequacy of new
and additional adaptation funding, the fact is that it will become
increasingly difficult for us [acting alone] to fully safeguard the
fundamental freedoms and rights of our island populations ....

"' Statement of Thailand, Eleventh Session, supra note 107.
140 Statement of Mauritius, Eleventh Session, supra note 104.
'4' Statement of the Maldives, Eleventh Session, supra note 105.
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This then raises the issue of international cooperation.... We
believe that such cooperation is not only desirable; it is vital and,
moreover, is a legal obligation under the core international
human rights instruments. Under these agreements there is a clear
extraterritorial obligation beholden on State Parties to refrain
from acting in such a way as knowingly undermines human rights
in other countries; a fact reinforced by reference to Principle 2 of
the Rio Declaration. There is also an extraterritorial legal
obligation to take steps through international assistance to
facilitate the fulfilment of human rights in other countries.' 4 2
Speaking along the same lines, Mauritius and Bhutan argued that they were
already doing their utmost (and certainly more than their fair share) to arrest
climate change, to protect the environment, and to promote human rights, but
that their small size and limited resources, coupled with the global nature of
climate change, meant that they could not win the fight alone. For example,
Mauritius noted that:
[D]espite our significant resource constraints; we have made
environmental protection one of our development priorities.
Mauritius, as many other small island developing states, has
demonstrated its commitments to ensuring environmental
protection and sustainability as well as promotion and protection
of human rights through the utilization of its limited resources.
While we are fully engaged at the national level, it is clear that
closer international cooperation is essential to enable mitigation,
disaster preparedness and adaptation measures .

.

.

. My

delegation notes in this regard OHCHR's analysis, in Report
A/HRC/10/61, that States Parties to core human rights treaties
have an extraterritorial legal obligation to refrain from taking
action which knowingly interferes with the enjoyment of human
rights in other countries, and to take steps through international

142

Shazra Abdul Sattar, First Sec'y, Maldives Permanent Mission to the United Nations,

Statement on Behalf of Twelve Small Island Developing States, Panel on Human Rights and
Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file
with the GeorgiaJournalofInternationaland ComparativeLaw) [hereinafter Statement of the
Small Island Developing States, Eleventh Session].
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cooperation and assistance to facilitate the fulfillment of those
rights .... 143
Speaking along similar lines, Bhutan stated that:
With one of the lowest green house gas emissions and 70% of
land under forest cover, [Bhutan has] surpassed carbon neutral
status and ha[s] a net sequestration of greenhouse gases. Yet the
threats we face as a result of climate change are multiple, with
devastating implications on the full and effective enjoyment of
human rights. 44
It was significant during the June 2009 debate that a number of smaller
developed countries including Slovenia, Monaco, and New Zealand expressed
sympathy for the more balanced position taken by vulnerable developing
states. These countries were probably influenced by a sense of empathy with
other small states as well as a related understanding of the limitations of
national action in the context of global challenges such a climate change.
Some, such as Slovenia, openly broke ranks with their Western group and EU
colleagues, arguing that while it is "well aware of the primary obligation of
states to protect individuals against the foreseeable threats of climate change
to human rights, [it] nevertheless believe[s] that international cooperation and
solidarity should be enhanced in order to minimize the effects of climate
change on the full enjoyment of human rights" and, in that context, "fully
agrees with the conclusion that international cooperation in [the field of
climate change] is a human rights obligation and that its central objective is the
realization of human rights."' 145 Other, such as Monaco, did not openly support
the concept of extraterritorial human rights obligations, but did at least
recognize that climate change (and related problems such as climate-induced
migration) seriously challenge the traditional state-centric view of human
rights law and, consequently, highlights the need for new thinking on "the
policies of cooperation."' 46 Finally, although it did not take a hard position,
143

Statement of Mauritius, Eleventh Session, supra note 104.

Statement of Bhutan, Eleventh Session, supra note 107.
Andrej Logar, Permanent Representative of Slovn. to the United Nations, Panel on Human
Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights Council (June 15,
2009) (on file with the GeorgiaJournalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw).
46 Webcast: Robert Fillon, Permanent Representative of Monaco to the United Nations,
Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human Rights
"
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New Zealand drew attention to the OHCHR conclusion that "international
obligations under human rights treaties provide for non-interference in the
enjoyment of others' rights" and asked for further consideration of this
point. 141
D. Climate-inducedMigration
In addition to comments on and responses to the three major legal questions
highlighted above, the other major theme raised by many delegations and
experts during the interactive panel debate was that of the human rights
implications of climate-induced migration.
While no delegation offered substantive views or policy prescriptions, there
was a widespread sense that climate-induced displacement, both within and
across borders, is already a major humanitarian challenge and will become
increasingly significant as the planet continues to warm. There was also a
sense that there exists a serious human rights protection gap for persons
displaced across borders. Azerbaijan, in its statement, referred to a June 2009
report by the Norwegian Refugee Council 41 which showed that in 2008 alone,
more than twenty million people were displaced as a result of climate
change, 4 9 while Monaco cited IPCC estimates that by the end of the century
around 150 million people will have been displaced. 5 ' Both Azerbaijan and
Monaco noted that this new phenomenon does not fit within existing
international refugee law and creates "new and complex judicial issues," and
therefore urged further consideration of the issue for "above and beyond the
legal issues, are, already, human emergencies linked to [climate change]."''
In addition to the legal gap concerning individuals forced to move across
borders because of climate change, a number of delegations also highlighted

Council (United Nations Human Rights Council, June 15, 2009), http://www.un.org/webcast/
unhrc/archive.asp?go=090615 [hereinafter Statement of Monaco, Eleventh Session].
147Amy Laurenson, Second Sec'y, Permanent Mission of N.Z. to the United Nations at

Geneva, Panel on Human Rights and Climate Change at the Eleventh Session of the Human
Rights Council (June 15, 2009) (on file with the Georgia Journal of International and
ComparativeLaw).
141

Statement of Azerbaijan, Eleventh Session, supra note 103.

149NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COuNcIL REPORTS, CLIMATE CHANGED: PEOPLE DISPLACED

6

(2009), availableat http://www.nrcfadder.no/arch/img.aspx?fileid--9913616.
ISO Statement of Monaco, Eleventh Session, supra note 146.
151 Id.; see also Statement of Azerbaijan, Eleventh Session, supra note 103 (stating that
current international refugee law does not recognize terms like "climate refugees" or

"environmental refugees").
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the fact that, according to the latest scientific estimates, the entire population
of some vulnerable Small Island Developing States may have to leave their
homeland by the end of this century due to rising sea levels. For example, the
Maldives, on behalf of twelve Small Island Developing States, drew attention
to the submission of the High Commissioner for Refugees to the UNFCCC's
Bali Process which states that "[t]he entire populations of low-lying States
such as the Maldives, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands may in [the]
future be obliged to leave their own country as a result of climate change.
Moreover, the existence of their State as such may be threatened. Entire
populations of affected states could thus become stateless."'5 The twelve
Small Island Developing States asked the panel what actions the Human Rights
Council should take "to protect the rights of these nations and their people, and
specifically the right to statehood, the right to self-determination and the right
53
of a people not to be deprived of its own means of subsistence."'
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE UNFCCC
Although it is not the main focus of this Article, it is important not to lose
sight of the fact that the original goal of the Male' Small Island Developing
States Conference and the Male' Declaration was to use human rights law and
its related mechanisms to influence and improve international climate change
policy as governed by the UNFCCC. That any actions of the Council should
be premised on complementing and encouraging (not duplicating) progress
under the UNFCCC framework was reiterated by both Resolution 7/23
(paragraph 5) and Resolution 10/4 (paragraph 2). In other words, as well as
understanding how the issue of climate change has influenced international
human rights law and thinking (the focus of this Article), it is important not to
lose sight of the parallel question of how human rights law and thinking can
be integrated into existing international climate change policy in order to make
that policy fairer and more effective. Although this crucial question is not
covered by the present Article, it is worth noting that a considerable amount
of progress has been made in linking the work done at the Human Rights
Council with the ongoing programme of work under the UNFCCC, which is

"' Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Submission to the 6th Session of AWGLCA 6 Under the UNFCCC, Climate Change and Statelessness: An Overview (May 15, 2009),
availableat http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/misc05.pdf.
. Statement of the Small Island Developing States, Eleventh Session, supranote 142.
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due to conclude with a new climate change agreement at the Sixteenth
Conference of Parties (COP-16) in Mexico City in December 2010.
In November 2009, as per Resolutions 7/23 (operative paragraph 3)
and 10/4 (operative paragraph 2), the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights transmitted both resolutions together with a summary of the
June 2009 panel debate to the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC "for its
consideration" ahead of the crucial climate change talks that were due to be
held the following month in Copenhagen (COP-15).'54
In truth, long before November 2009, human rights language and concepts
had begun to cross-fertilize with and feed into the Bali Process of UNFCCC
talks. Geneva-based diplomats from the Maldives, Switzerland, and other
countries that had led the Human Rights Council process, with the support of
various NGOs, had been working closely with their climate change experts
ever since COP-13 in Bali to try to integrate human rights into the evolving
post-Kyoto climate change framework.' 55
Despite initial resistance, by the end of COP-15 in Copenhagen, these
efforts had begun to bear fruit. In the draft outcome of work contained in the
report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
(AWGLCA) following COP-15,156 the preambular section of the draft text
contains a number of references to human rights and/or human rights
principles:
Preambular paragraph 8:
Noting resolution 10/4 of the United Nations Human Rights
Council on human rights and climate change.... "'

114 U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], Panel Discussion on the Relationship
Between
Climate Change and Human Rights: Summary of Discussions, 2 (June 15, 2009), availableat
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/index.htm.
' U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Ad Hoc Working Group
on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Ideas and Proposals on
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Revised Note by the Chair, 97, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/16/REV.1 (Jan. 15, 2009).
156 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Ad Hoc Working
Group
on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Report oftheAdHoc Working Group
on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention on its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/17 (Feb. 5,2010), availableat http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awg
lca8/eng/1 7.pdf [hereinafter AWGLCA/2009/17].
. Id. at Annex I, pmbl. para. 8. While it would have been preferable for the text to
"recognise" or "endorse" Resolution 10/4, it is nevertheless significant that the resolution has
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Preambular paragraph 9:
Mindful that the adverse effects of climate change have a range
of direct and indirect implications for the full enjoyment of
human rights, including living well, and that the effects of
climate change will be felt most acutely by those parts of the
population that are already vulnerable owing to youth, gender,
age or disability. 5 '
Preambular paragraph 10:
Recognizing the right of all nations to survival. ... .
Preambular paragraph 11:
Further recognizing that a broad range of stakeholders needs to
be engaged on global, regional, national and local levels, be
they governmental, including subnational and local
government, private business or civil society, including the
youth and persons with disability, and that gender equality and
the effective participation of women and indigenous peoples are
important for effective action on all aspects of climate
change.160

been explicitly mentioned as it provides an entry point for those concepts contained in
Resolution 10/4 to be applied to, and inform the implementation of, the Convention.
"' Id. at Annex I, pmbl. para. 9. This paragraph is an amalgam of preambular paragraphs
seven and eight of Resolution 10/4. It is extremely positive in that it clarifies for the first time
in a climate change agreement, or any environmental agreement, that environmental degradation
has a range of direct and indirect impacts on a wide range of explicitly cited human rights. It
also introduces a new concept into the climate change negotiations-namely intra-state equity.
Equity between states (common but differentiated responsibility) has long been a core principle
of the international climate change architecture; but equity within states (i.e., that certain
population groups are more affected, and thus require higher protection) has long been
neglected. The second part of preambular paragraph nine addresses this weakness.
159Id. at Annex I, pmbl. para. 10. This paragraph was inserted at the insistence of countries
of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Notwithstanding, the right does not exist under
human rights law-Resolution 10/4 talks instead of the right to self-determination and the right
of a people not to be deprived of its own means of subsistence. A number of developed
countries oppose reference to the "right of all nations to survival" because it goes beyond
international law.
" Id. at Annex I, pmbl. para. 11. Although it does not mention the words "human rights,"
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In addition, the section of the draft dealing with Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries
contains numerous references to the rights of indigenous peoples. For
example, it affirms that all REDD policies must respect "the knowledge and
rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into
account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws,
and noting that the General Assembly has adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples."' 6 1 The REDD section also
reaffirms the importance of guaranteeing full participatory rights for affected
populations, especially indigenous peoples. 62 Indigenous rights are also cited
in the section on "Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions
in agriculture."' 63
While the human rights language in the AWGLCA draft text is far from
perfect and while, disappointingly, the draft decision on adaptation contains
no reference to human rights or participatory rights, it remains noteworthy that,
at the end of COP- 15, no country was advocating the removal of the above
mentioned references. This represents a remarkable turnaround for the
acceptance by states of the links between climate change and human rights
and, by extension, of the links between the environment and human rights. In
early 2008, a majority of states represented in the Human Rights Council in
Geneva did not accept there was any link between climate change and human
rights. By March 2008, states in the Council were willing to accept that
climate change has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights, but
beyond that there was no consensus. By March 2009, states in the Council not
only agreed on the clear presence of a relationship, but on the broad parameters

this paragraph strongly promotes universally recognized participatory and procedural rights;
namely the right to information, the right to participate in decision-making, and the right to
equality and non-discrimination. In the past, climate change policy has often been implemented
without the knowledge or participation of affected population groups, and has been ineffective
or even counterproductive as a result. Human rights have often been infringed rather than
promoted by national adaptation plans, for example. Promoting participatory and procedural
rights should help to address this. Promoting participatory rights for marginalized groups,
including women, is also cited in the Draft Decision on Enhanced Action on Capacity-Building,
operative paragraph 4(f). Id. at 30-31.
16 Draft Decision on Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives on Issues Relating to
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries; and
the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest
Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries, operative paragraph 2(c). Id. at 35.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 43, pmbl. para. 3.
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of that relationship. However, there was still enormous resistance, on the part
of states within the Bali Process-even many Small Island Developing
States-to accept this evolving consensus and transfer it into the climate
change talks. This was mostly due to what the ICHRP has termed "path
dependence." "6And yet, by the end of 2009 at COP-15, all states in the
UNFCCC accepted the link between global warming and related environmental
degradation, and the full enjoyment of human rights. Moreover, all states
accepted the idea that human rights principles, when employed in the context
of climate change "have the potential to inform and strengthen international
and national policy-making in the area of climate change, promoting policy
coherence, legitimacy and sustainable outcomes."' 65
VII. CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that much progress has been made by the international human
rights community in addressing and understanding the interface between
climate change and human rights. In March 2008, there was strong objection
to the mere notion that climate change has implications for the full enjoyment
of human rights. By June 2009, there was not only broad acceptance of the
existence of a relationship between climate change and human rights, but also
a clear convergence of views on the nature and character of the relationship.
Moreover, by June 2009, thanks to the OHCHR's report and the subsequent
debates in the Human Rights Council, there was also a very clear sense of the
key outstanding issues and questions created by the effort to link climate
change policy with international human rights law, as well as of the fault lines
running between different state views on those issues and questions. The first
of these questions is whether the physical impacts of climate change can be
construed as a human rights violation in the strictest legal sense, with
identifiable victims and perpetrators, and thus whether they can be placed
within an accountability and redress framework. The second concerns the
character and the extent of state human rights obligations both vis-A-vis their
own citizens and vis-A-vis persons living outside their territory.
The first outstanding question (regarding the presence or otherwise of a
human rights violation) may not have been answered to the satisfaction of all

"6Climate change negotiators tend to be experts in the natural sciences with little or no
interest or knowledge of human rights law or its potential utility in environmental matters.
"" UNHRC 10/4, supra note 82, at pmbl. para. 10.
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states but nonetheless is unlikely, for political reasons, to be a key focus of the
human rights and climate change agenda in the near term.
The second question, on the other hand, is likely to be a continuing source
of interest, debate, and disagreement in the Human Rights Council. This is
because demonstrating that international action to reduce emissions and to
provide adequate adaptation support is a legal obligation under international
human rights law is likely to be one of the major contributions of the human
rights community to global efforts to address climate change. It is also because
climate change, as one of the ultimate manifestations of globalization, neatly
encapsulates the schism that exists between the concept of human rights that
exists in most parts of the developed world-as essentially a contract between
a state and its citizens-and the one that exists in most parts of the developing
world-as a contract that exists both within and between states.
Thus there seems little doubt that the Human Rights Council and related
mechanisms will continue to wrestle, over the coming years, with the
following three questions:
1. How can human rights obligations and principles be best
applied to national climate change policy (across both
mitigation and adaptation) in order to improve the quality and
effectiveness of that policy, including ensuring that priority is
given to the most vulnerable segments of society?
2. What is the precise nature of exterritorial human rights
obligations as they relate to climate change and how can the
international community, through the international human
rights mechanisms, best draw attention to and enforce those
obligations in a manner that complements and supports the
UNFCCC process?
3. What is the exact balance or relationship, in the context of
climate change, between national-level obligations and
international-level obligations?
For example, if
extraterritorial obligations are applicable insofar as they
construct an enabling environment in which individual states
can effectively protect the human rights of their citizens, how
might we know when those extraterritorial obligations are
being honoured and when they are not? In the context of
climate change, would such obligations be met if emissions
and temperature rises were restricted to "safe levels?" If
extraterritorial obligations are not honored, what is the
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consequence of this vis-A-vis the national-level human rights
obligations of,say, a small, vulnerable state? Can such a state
really be held responsible for failure to fulfill the human
rights of its people in the absence of an international enabling
environment?
In addition to these questions, the June 2009 debate also highlighted
widespread concern on the part of the international community about the status
of "climate-induced migrants" and about the human rights protection afforded
to them. Questions raised in this regard include:
1. What is the legal status of these people; should they fall under
a reformed Refugee Convention, under the new UNFCCC
treaty or under a new and separate international convention?
2. Who is responsible for protecting their human rights?
3. What are the rights of people fleeing so-called "disappearing
states"?'6 6
Following the adoption of Resolutions 7/23 and 10/4, the publication ofthe
OHCHR Report, and the conclusion of the June 2009 panel debate, the
challenge facing the Human Rights Council is now whether, and, if so, how it
should tackle these questions. There are a number of options:
1. Do nothing: Many states (especially certain industrialised
states, oil producing states, and emerging economies) do not
wish the climate change human rights agenda to be taken any
further.
2. Further mobilization of UN Special Procedures: Special
Procedures, as independent human rights experts, are uniquely
well-placed to address the difficult questions outlined above.
Taking their lead from operational paragraph 3 of Resolution
10/4 and following the Sixteenth Joint Meeting of Special
Procedures in July 2009 which dedicated an explicit agenda

'
For an excellent summary of these issues, see Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini,
Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposalfor a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 349 (2009) (discussing several of the issues and concerns surrounding
climate-induced migrants).
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item to the issue of climate change,'67 many mandate-holders,
including on the right to adequate housing, on the right to
food, on access to safe drinking water, on poverty, and on
internally-displaced persons, are already undertaking research
into the implications of global warming within their mandate.
However, there is certainly scope for deeper engagement, both
individually and jointly. For example, states might use the
regular interactive dialogues with Special Procedures to
encourage them to develop joint guidelines on applying
human rights obligations and principles to domestic climate
change policy.
3. Pursue a new Special Procedure mandate specific to human
rights and climate change: While such a mandate would be
useful in terms of keeping the issue "alive" at the Human
Rights Council and in terms of helping to clarify some of the
legal questions referred to earlier, it is not certain how
effective such a mandate would be in reality or whether it
would accomplish more than existing mandates operating in
tandem.
4. Await developments in the Human Rights Treaty Bodies:
Because many of the arguments about the nature of
extraterritorial obligations in the context of climate change
are in effect issues of interpretation of the core international
human rights treaties, Treaty Bodies have the potential to play
a key role in clarifying the issues (for example, through a
General Comment), as well as in integrating climate change
considerations, where appropriate, into the national reporting
process. As with Special Procedures, there is evidence that
Treaty Bodies are taking an increasing interest in the human
rights implications of climate change. For example, during
the Forty-Fourth Session ofthe Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) from July 20 to
August 7, 2009, the Committee issued a statement on the

167See U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of Special

Rapporteurs/Representatives,Independent Expertsand Chairpersonsof Working Groupsofthe
Special Proceduresof the HumanRights Council, IT 40-41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1 2/47 (July 22,
2009).
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gender implications of climate change. 6 Moreover, on May
13, 2010, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights held an informal half-day session in Geneva on the
implications of climate change for economic, social and
cultural rights. During the session, the Committee discussed
a paper, published by the Center for International
Environmental Law (CIEL), the Geneva Office of Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung (FES), and the Housing and Land Rights
Network (HLRN), entitled "Climate Change in the Work of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights."' 6 9
The Committee is now considering holding a formal one-day
meeting on the issue.
5. Universal Periodic Review (UPR): National reviews under the
UPR mechanism are a useful forum in which to highlight and
explore the obligations of states not to interfere in the
enjoyment of human rights elsewhere as well as to extend
adaptation assistance. Such issues are increasingly being
raised in both national UPR reports, and in UPR working
group dialogues, especially by Small Developing Island
States. 7 0
6. Follow-up resolution: It seems unlikely that states will pursue
a third resolution on the general subject of human rights and
climate change largely because it would be almost impossible
to secure agreement between states on the key outstanding
questions, such as the balance between national and
international human rights obligations. However, because of
the growing international interest in the subject of climateinduced migration and the human rights implications thereof
(including the related problem of statelessness), there is a
possibility that the Council would consider a new resolution
on this subject designed to explore the issue and suggest ways

168

Statement of the CEDAW Committee on Gender and Climate Change (July 20-Aug. 7,

2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/Gender-and-climatecha
nge.pdf.
169Center for International Environmental Law, CIEL Publishes Climate Change in the Work
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://ciel.org/Hre/CESCR_13Jul
10.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2010).
70 See Limon, supra note 4, at 465 (discussing the use of the UPR mechanism to "explore
the human impacts of climate change").
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in which the apparent human rights protection gap might be
filled.
7. Reintroduce broader issue of human rights and the
environment: It is clear that the core issues that emerged from
the June 2009 panel debate (such as the character of
extraterritorial human rights obligations, and the balance
between those obligations and national-level obligations) are
not only important in the context of climate change - they are
also relevant to the issue of environmental degradation more
broadly. Thus, one way of moving forward would be to
reenergize the wider agenda on human rights and the
environment - an agenda which has unfortunately made little
progress since the 1972 Stockholm Declaration' 7' and has
largely ground to a halt since Commission on Human Rights
resolution 2003/71 on human rights and the environment as
part of sustainable development. Resolutions 7/23 and 10/4
have taken the international community's understanding of
the links between human rights and the environment further
than at any moment since Stockholm, and certainly much
further than states were willing to go at the time of the 2003
Commission on Human Rights resolution. It could therefore
be argued that now is an opportune time to table a new
resolution at the Human Rights Council on human rights and
the environment; a resolution which might, for example,
establish a new Special Procedure mandate on the subject and
who would address the difficult issues raised by states in the
June 2009 debate.
In addition to these options in the Human Rights Council and related
mechanisms, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the original goal
of the Male' Small Island Developing States Conference and the Male'
Declaration was to use human rights law and mechanisms to influence and
improve international climate change policy as governed by the UNFCCC.
That any actions in the Council should be premised on complementing and
encouraging (not duplicating) progress under the UNFCCC framework was

' U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972,
Declaration,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972), reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972).
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reiterated by both Resolution 7/23 (paragraph 5) and Resolution 10/4
(paragraph 2). In other words, as well as understanding how the issue of
climate change has influenced international human rights law and thinking, it
is important not to lose sight of the parallel question of how human rights law
and thinking can be integrated into international climate change policy in order
to make that policy fairer and more effective. Although this crucial question
is not covered by the present Article, it is worth noting that a considerable
amount of progress has been made in linking the work done at the Human
Rights Council with the UNFCCC's Bali Roadmap, which had been due to
adopt a new climate change agreement at the Fifteenth Conference of Parties
in Copenhagen in December 2009.
In November 2009, as per Resolutions 7/23 (operative paragraph 3)
and 10/4 (operative paragraph 2), the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights transmitted both resolutions together with a summary of the
June panel debate to the Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC "for its
consideration." As a result of these steps to link the work of the two bodies,
and also following lobbying in the UNFCCC process by a number of
countries,"' the draft outcome of work of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on
Long-term Cooperative Action which emerged from Copenhagen (and which
should be adopted at COP- 16 in Mexico) contains a number of human rights
references and concepts, especially in the Shared Vision section which makes
explicit reference to Resolution 10/4, and repeats concepts contained in
paragraphs 7 and 8 of Resolution 10/4 by noting that "the adverse effects of
climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications for the full
'
and that such effects will be "felt most acutely
enjoyment of human rights"173
by those parts of the population that are already vulnerable owing to youth,
gender, age or disability." 7 4

I" Particularly the Maldives and Switzerland.
173 AWGLCA/2009/17,
174 Id.

supra note 156, at Annex I, pmbl. para. 9.

